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I. ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Appellant requests oral argument because of the important issues this appeal 
implicates. 
II. LIST OF PARTIES 
All parties involved in this appeal are identified in the caption. 
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V. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3). 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in refusing to enforce Mr. Baker's and Dr. 
Rosenthal's Arbitration Agreement? (R. at 84-85.) 
VII. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
"A trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration presents a question of law 
which we review for correctness." See Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Sys., Inc., 
731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986). 
Whether evidence presented was "insufficient as a matter of law to require 
enforcement of the binding arbitration amendment" is a matter the Court reviews for 
correctness. See McCoy v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31, ^|12, 20 P.3d 
901. 
"The proper interpretation of a statute is [] a question of law, which we review for 
correctness." Toone v. Weber County, 2002 UT 103, 57 P.3d 1079. 
VIII. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The district court's determination concerning the enforceability of an arbitration 
agreement in a medical malpractice action is governed in part by the Utah Healthcare 
Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17, the Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3 la-3, et seq., (2003) (repealed effective May 15, 2003) and Utah's wrongful death 
survival statutes found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7 and § 78-11-12. 
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IX. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings and Disposition 
Below. 
Gary Baker, now deceased, sought medical care from appellants. (R. at 3-4.) On 
April 3, 2001, prior to receiving medical care from Dr. Rosenthal, Mr. Baker signed a 
document clearly entitled "Arbitration Agreement." (R. at 5-6.) 
In the Arbitration Agreement, Mr. Baker and Dr. Rosenthal agreed to arbitrate "all 
disputes and claims for damages of any kind for injuries and losses arising from the 
medical care rendered or which should have been rendered after the date of this 
Agreement. . . including, without limitation, claims for personal injury, loss of 
consortium, wrongful death, emotional distress or punitive damages . . . ." Mr. Baker and 
Dr. Rosenthal also specifically expressed that it was their intent by the Arbitration 
Agreement to "bind all persons whose claims for injuries and losses arise out o f Dr. 
Rosenthal's care, "including any spouse or heirs of the patient and any children . . . giving 
rise to any claim . . ." (R. at 10.) 
After Mr. Baker died on April 11, 2001, appellee Christine Baker, Mr. Baker's 
surviving spouse and the personal representative for his estate,1 filed a complaint on 
behalf of herself and Mr. Baker's other heirs alleging medical malpractice relating to the 
care and treatment of Mr. Baker. (R. at 2, 5-7.) The appellants moved to stay the 
proceedings and to enforce the Arbitration Agreement based on the Utah Arbitration Act, 
1
 Appellee Christine Baker and Mr. Baker's heirs are designated herein as the 
"Bakers." 
2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-3, et seq., Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
78-14-17, and Utah Code. Ann. § 78-11-12(1) and § 78-11-7. (R. at 7-19.) 
The district court refused to enforce the Arbitration Agreement against the Bakers, 
holding that the Bakers' "wrongful death action is separate and distinct from the cause of 
action the deceased would have had for personal injuries had he survived," that the 
Bakers' "cause of action for wrongful death is wholly separate and distinct from any 
action her husband might have maintained," and that, in any event, the Bakers "did not 
sign the Arbitration Agreement." (R. at 84-85.) This appeal followed. 
B. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented. 
1. This is an action for alleged medical negligence arising from care 
rendered to Gary Baker. (R. at 3-4.) 
2. Mr. Baker was 53 years old at the time of his death. (R. at 4.) 
3. Mr. Baker had a history of heart disease in his immediate family and 
suffered from anxiety, depression, stress, and obesity. (R. at 4.) 
4. Mr. Baker was being treated by various healthcare providers for 
several conditions, including but not limited to: depression, anxiety, stress, tension 
headaches, gastroesophageal reflux, chest pains, hypertension, and migraine headaches. 
(R. at 4.) 
5. Mr. Baker's primary care physician, Gregory Stevens, M.D., referred 
Mr. Baker to Richard Rosenthal, M.D., for pain management of Mr. Baker's migraine 
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headaches. Mr. Baker was seen by Dr. Rosenthal one time on April 3, 2001 for treatment 
of his migraine headaches. (R. at 4.) 
6. Mr. Baker died on April 11, 2001 as a result of Coronary Artery 
Arteriosclerosis. (R. at 4.) 
7. The Bakers filed a complaint on behalf of Mr. Baker's estate 
alleging medical malpractice relating to the care and treatment of Mr. Baker subsequent 
to April 3, 2001. (R. at 5-6.) 
8. Mrs. Baker brought the action as "the surviving spouse of Gary 
Baker" and "the duly appointed personal representative of the estate of Gary Baker." (R. 
at 5-6.) 
9. Mrs. Baker alleges that she can bring the present action because 
"Utah law permits the personal representative of the estate of a deceased person to bring 
an action for wrongful death on behalf of all the heirs of the deceased." (R. at 6.) 
10. On April 3, 2001, prior to any care rendered by Dr. Rosenthal, Mr. 
Baker and Dr. Rosenthal executed an arbitration agreement. (R. at 10.) (the "Arbitration 
Agreement"). That Arbitration Agreement includes the following provisions: 
Article 1: Agreement to Arbitrate: We hereby agree to submit to binding 
arbitration all disputes and claims for damages of any kind for injuries and 
losses arising from the medical care rendered or which should have been 
rendered after the date of this Agreement. All claims for monetary damages 
against the physician, and the physician's partners, associates, association, 
corporation or partnership, and the employees, agents and estates of any of 
them (herein collectively referred to as "physician"), must be arbitrated 
including without limitation, claims for personal injury, loss of consortium, 
wrongful death, emotional distress or punitive damages. . . . 
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We expressly intend this Agreement shall bind all persons whose claims for 
injuries and losses arise out of medical care rendered or which should have 
been rendered by Physician after the date of this Agreement, including any 
spouse or heirs of the patient and any children, whether born or unborn at 
the time of the occurrence giving rise to any claim (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as "Patient"). 
Article 2: Waiver of Right of Trial: We expressly waive all rights to 
pursue any legal action to seek damages or any other remedies in a court of 
law, including the right to a jury or court trial, except to enforce our 
decision to arbitrate, to collect any arbitration award and to facilitate the 
arbitration process as permitted by the Utah Arbitration Act. 
* * * 
Article 7: Read and Understood: I (Patient or Patient's representative ) 
have read and I understand the above Agreement. I understand that I have 
the right to have my questions about arbitration answered and I do not have 
any unanswered questions. I execute this agreement of my own free will 
and not under any duress, and I understand that [] my signing this 
agreement is not a requirement in order to receive medical services from 
Physician. 
(R. at 10.) 
X. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court refused to enforce the Arbitration Agreement against the Bakers, 
holding that the Bakers' "wrongful death action is separate and distinct from the cause of 
action the deceased would have had for personal injuries had he survived," that the 
Bakers5 "cause of action for wrongful death is wholly separate and distinct from any 
action her husband might have maintained," and that, in any event, the Bakers "did not 
sign the Arbitration Agreement." (R. at 84-85.) 
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The district court erred in refusing to enforce the Arbitration Agreement. The 
parties to the Arbitration Agreement expressly intended that the Bakers, as the decedent's 
heirs, would be bound by the agreement. Dr. Rosenthal, therefore, is entitled to assert the 
Arbitration Agreement as a defense to the Bakers' wrongful death claims that are 
derivative of any claims Mr. Baker could have brought against Dr. Rosenthal, had he 
survived. Indeed, the Utah statutes governing arbitration agreements anticipate the result 
that the spouse and heirs of a decedent would be bound by a decedent's arbitration 
agreement. Moreover, the Bakers are bound by the Arbitration Agreement because of 
their position as express third-party beneficiaries and Mrs. Baker is specifically bound by 
the agreement as Mr. Baker's wife and as the personal representative of Mr. Baker's 
estate. Finally, any other result would be contrary to public policy. Utah has accorded 
patients significant statutory privacy rights and rights of self-determination, and to permit 
a spouse and heirs to overrun those rights would be contrary to long-standing public 
policy. 
XL ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ENFORCE 
THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT. 
The issue on appeal is not the validity of the Arbitration Agreement, but whether it 
is enforceable against a deceased patient's spouse and heirs where the patient specifically 
intended that any litigation concerning healthcare he received be arbitrated. Despite the 
existence of a valid arbitration agreement, the district court declined to compel arbitration 
6 
against the Bakers, reasoning that the Bakers were not bound by the Arbitration 
Agreement because they did not sign it and their wrongful death claims against appellants 
were "separate and distinct from any action [Mr. Baker] might have maintained." (R. at 
84-85.) 
1. The Bakers Are Bound by the Arbitration Agreement. 
Mr. Baker, the decedent whose life is the subject of the Bakers' wrongful death 
action, specifically and "expressly intend[ed] that th[e] Arbitration Agreement shall bind 
all persons whose claims for injuries and losses arise out of medical care rendered [by Dr. 
Rosenthal] . . . including any spouse or heirs of [Mr. Baker] . . . ." (R at 10.) (Arbitration 
Agreement, Article 1.) This Court should enforce the intent of Mr. Baker and Dr. 
Rosenthal and bind the Bakers to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement based on the 
plain language of the agreement. 
a. Defenses binding upon the deceased and his claims, 
including enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement, are 
binding upon the Bakers and their derivative wrongful 
death claims. 
Although "an action for wrongful death is an independent action accruing in the 
heirs of the deceased," Utah courts have "not entirely separated the heirs' right from the 
decedent's because the heirs' right is in major part based on the rights of support, both 
financial and emotional, that run to them from the deceased." Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, 
Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 332 (Utah 1997). "[T]he wrongful death cause of action is based on 
the underlying wrong done to the decedent and may only proceed subject to at least some 
7 
of the defenses that would have been available against the decedent had she lived to 
maintain her own action." Id. Indeed, this Court's reading of the heir's cause of action in 
Jensen is supported by the language of Section 78-11-12(1), the survival statute: 
Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the person or death caused 
by the wrongful act or negligence of another do not abate upon the death 
of the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured person or the 
personal representatives or heirs of the person who died have a cause of 
action against the wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the 
wrongdoer for special and general damages . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
At the district court, the Bakers primarily relied upon Pacheco v. Allen, 55 P.3d 
141 (Colo. App. 2001), a case the Bakers argued was "persuasive authority" and was "in 
point." (R. at 38.) The reasoning concerning derivative claims found in Pacheco to be 
persuasive, however, was recently rejected by the Colorado Supreme Court in Allen v. 
Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 379, 80 (Colo. 2003) (en banc).2 
In their brief opposing the Motion to Stay and Compel Arbitration, the Bakers 
cited the earlier Pacheco opinion for the position that the Arbitration Agreement is not 
binding upon the heirs of Mr. Baker because their "cause of action for wrongful death 
here is wholly separate and distinct from any action [Mr. Baker] might have maintained, 
[thus] the arbitration provision is not applicable [to the Bakers]." (R. at 38 (quoting 
2The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the Colorado Court of Appeals' refusal to 
enforce the arbitration agreement at issue against the deceased's spouse and heirs based 
on the agreement's failure to comply with the requirements of the Colorado Health Care 
Availability Act. The court, however, specifically rejected each of the Court of Appeals' 
bases for refusing to enforce the agreement. 
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Pacheco, 55 P.3d at 143.)) The Colorado Supreme Court rejected this analysis relied 
upon by the lower court stating: 
Although it is true that a wrongful death claim is separate and distinct from 
a cause of action the deceased could have maintained had he survived, this 
observation is not helpful in determining whether separate wrongful death 
claims are in fact included within the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
[arbitration] agreement. 
Allen, 71 P.3d at 379. The Allen court held that the plaintiffs wrongful death claim was 
included in "the plain and ordinary meaning'" of the arbitration agreement at issue. Here, 
as in Allen, the Arbitration Agreement states in plain language that it applies to claims for 
"wrongful death" and the heirs, therefore, are bound by its terms. (R. at 10.) (Arbitration 
Agreement, Article 1.) 
Likewise, this Court and courts of other jurisdictions have bound the non-party 
heirs of a deceased to defenses enforceable against the deceased in at least the following 
circumstances: 
1. Heirs are bound by a statute of limitations defense enforceable against the 
deceased and any causes of action the deceased could have brought. See Jensen, 944 P.2d 
at 332. 
2. Heirs are bound by a comparative negligence defense to the extent 
enforceable against the deceased and any causes of action the deceased could have 
brought. See Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152, 1155 (Utah 1989). 
3. Heirs are bound by the Worker's Compensation Act as to claims against the 
deceased's employer. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105 ("employee's spouse, widow, 
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children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representatives" are bound by 
Workers' Compensation Act limitations). 
Here, as is the case with statute of limitations, comparative negligence, and the 
Worker's Compensation Act, the Bakers' causes of action are subject to the Arbitration 
Agreement. This Court should therefore reverse the trial court and enforce the 
Arbitration Agreement. 
b. The Bakers are bound by the Arbitration Agreement as 
third-party beneficiaries. 
Even though the Bakers did not sign the Arbitration Agreement, they are bound by 
its terms as third-party beneficiaries. 
"The existence of third party beneficiary status 'is determined by examining a 
written contract." Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109,1J11, 62 P.3d 440 (quotation 
omitted). "The written contract must show that the contracting parties 'clearly intended 
to confer a separate and distinct benefit upon the third party.'" Id. (quotation omitted). 
Therefore, this Court examines the parties' Arbitration Agreement to determine whether 
the parties clearly intended to subject Mrs. Baker and Mr. Baker's heirs to arbitration for 
claims arising out of Dr. Rosenthal's care and treatment of Mr. Baker. 
"If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the 
parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and 
the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. 
Corp., 2002 UT 88, PI9, 54 P.3d 1139 (quotation omitted). "Whether the contract itself 
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is ambiguous is also a question of law." Wagner, 2002 UT 109 at [^12. "An ambiguity 
exists if the contract provision is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." 
Id. There is no ambiguity here. Article 1 of the Arbitration Agreement provides that Mr. 
Baker and Dr. Rosenthal "expressly intend that this Arbitration Agreement shall bind all 
persons whose claims for injuries and losses arise out of medical care rendered or which 
should have been rendered by [Dr. Rosenthal] after the date of this Agreement, including 
any spouse or heirs of the patient and any children . . . ." (R. at 10.) 
"The predominant inquiry in any third party beneficiary case is whether the 
contracting parties clearly intended the third party to receive a separate and distinct 
benefit from the contract." See Oxendine v. Overturf, 1999 UT 45 \\A. "[I]t is not 
enough that the parties to the contract know, expect or even intend that others will benefit 
from the [contract] . . . . The contract must be undertaken for the Appellant's direct 
benefit and the contract itself must affirmatively make this intention clear." American 
Towers, 930 P.2d at 1188 (quotation omitted). Here, it is beyond dispute that Mr. Baker 
and Dr. Rosenthal expressly and affirmatively intended to bind Mrs. Baker and Mr. 
Baker's heirs to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. (R. at 10.) 
The benefits of the Arbitration Agreement include the "speedy and inexpensive 
methods of adjudicating disputes," see Alfred v. Educators Mut. Ins. Assn. of Utah, 909 
P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996), and "giving effect to the intentions of the parties[ and] 
easing court congestion," Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1073 
(Utah 1981). As a further benefit, Mr. Baker and Dr. Rosenthal also specifically entered 
11 
into the Arbitration Agreement intending that "arbitration proceedings" remain "private, 
not public, and the privacy of the parties and of the arbitration proceedings shall be 
preserved." (R at 10.) (Arbitration Agreement, Article 3.) In making the Arbitration 
Agreement in this case, Mr. Baker and Dr. Rosenthal "expressly intend[ed] that th[e] 
Arbitration Agreement shall bind all persons whose claims for injuries and losses arise 
out of medical care rendered [by Dr. Rosenthal] . . . including any spouse or heirs of [Mr. 
Baker] . . . ." (R at 10.) (Arbitration Agreement, Article 1.) 
Furthermore, like third-party beneficiaries to an arbitration agreement, courts have 
also found a spouse and heirs to be bound by a release agreement or assumption of the 
risk agreement signed by the deceased. See Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) (hold harmless agreement signed by decedent barred surviving 
husband's wrongful death action); Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 4th 748, 
757, 29 Cal Rptr.2d 177, 182 (1993) ("The decedent's express release of any negligence 
liability on the part of Paralift binds his heirs in this action and provides Paralift with a 
complete defense."); Rowan v. Vail Holdings, Inc., 31 F. Supp.2d 889, 895 (D. Colo. 
1998) ("if [the deceased] would have been barred from suing Vail because of the release, 
his parents will be barred from asserting their wrongful death claim under the above 
authority."); Kullingv. Grinders for Industry, Inc., 115 F. Supp.2d 828, 852 (E.D. Mich. 
2000) (spouse bound by release of claims found in her deceased spouse's employment 
separation agreement). But see Hawkins ex rel Hawkins v. Peart, 2001 UT 94, 37 P.3d 
1062 (minor's claims not barred by release agreement signed by parents). 
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The Colorado Supreme Court in Allen v. Pacheco, supra, also addressed the earlier 
Colorado "court of appeals['] reasoning] that the arbitration clause does not apply to a 
non-party such as Pacheco because a non-party to a contractual agreement cannot be 
bound by its terms." Id. The Colorado Supreme Court denounced this statement of the 
law as "inaccurate" and ruled that "[although it is true that in general, only the parties to 
a contract are bound by its terms, a non-party may fall within the scope of the agreement 
if the parties so intend." Id. at 379-80 (citations omitted concerning third-party 
beneficiary exception). 
Mr. Baker and Dr. Rosenthal undertook the Arbitration Agreement not only for Dr. 
Rosenthal's benefit, but also for Mrs. Baker's and the heirs' direct benefit and 
affirmatively made this intention clear by naming Mrs. Baker and Mr. Baker's heirs in the 
terms and language of the agreement.3 The Bakers are bound by the terms of the 
Arbitration Agreement as third-party beneficiaries and the Court should order arbitration 
accordingly. See Parsley v. Terminix Int'l. Co., LP, 1998 WL 1572764 (S.D. Ohio) 
(arbitration agreement enforced against third-party beneficiary); Terminix Int'l. Co., LP v. 
Ponzio, 693 So.2d 104 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997) (same). 
c. Mrs. Baker, as Mr. Baker's wife, is bound by the 
Arbitration Agreement. 
3
 Another way to look at the issue is to determine if the Arbitration Agreement 
could be enforced in the other direction, i.e., would the heirs be able to claim that they are 
third-party beneficiaries to the agreement and enforce it against Dr. Rosenthal? It is clear 
from the plain language of the Arbitration Agreement that Mr. Baker intended for his 
heirs to be able to enforce the Arbitration Agreement and, therefore, Dr. Rosenthal is 
entitled to enforce the agreement against the Bakers. 
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Under Utah law, Mr. Baker bound Mrs. Baker, his wife, to the terms of the 
Arbitration Agreement. A husband may act as the agent for his wife and bind her to 
contracts for family expenses, such as the medical expenses found in this case. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-2-8 and -9. Moreover, Utah Code. Ann. § 78-14-5 provides that a 
married person is authorized to consent to health care for his or her spouse. Courts in 
other jurisdictions have enforced arbitration agreements in medical malpractice cases 
against a non-signatory spouse based on this same agency relationship. See, e.g., Bolanos 
v Khalatian, 321 Cal.App.3d 1586 (1991). Similarly, courts have also enforced medical 
arbitration agreements against non-signatory minor children. See, e.g., Pietrelli v. 
PeacockM* Cal.App.4th 943 (1993). 
In this case, Mr. Baker agreed that he "expressly intend[ed] this Agreement shall 
bind all persons whose claims for injuries and losses arise out of medical care rendered or 
which should have been rendered by Physician after the date of this Agreement, 
including any spouse or heirs of the patient " (R at 10.) (Arbitration Agreement, 
Article 2.) (emphasis added.) For the purposes of the Arbitration Agreement, Mr. Baker 
acted as his wife's agent and she is bound by its terms. 
d. Mrs. Baker, as Mr. Baker's personal representative, is 
bound by the Arbitration Agreement. 
The personal representative of a decedent's estate is bound by contracts signed by 
the decedent. See, e.g., In re Estate ofShepley, 645 P.2d 605 (Utah 1982) (real estate 
purchase contract and attorney's fees provision enforceable); Colorado Nat'I. Bank of 
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Denver v. Friedman, 846 P.2d 159 (Col. 1993) (en banc) (personal representative bound 
by contracts of decedent). Here, Mrs. Baker brought claims as the personal representative 
and on behalf of "herself and the other heirs of Gary Baker." (R. at 6.) Mr. Baker 
specifically bound his heirs to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement and this Court 
should enforce that agreement. 
2. Utah Statutes Anticipate Enforcement of Arbitration 
Agreements Against the Spouse and Heirs of Mr. Baker. 
The Utah Arbitration Act anticipates that an arbitration agreement would apply to 
a decedent's heirs. This act provides that "[a] written agreement to submit any existing 
or future controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable" except under 
certain conditions not found or argued here. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-3 (emphasis 
added); see also Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Utah 1981) 
(nothing prevents agreement to arbitrate future claims or disputes); Allred v. Educators 
Mut. Ins. Assn. of Utah, 909 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996) ("The Act supports arbitration 
of both present and future disputes . . . ."). 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act also specifically envisions the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements against persons other than the patient. Section 78-14-17(1 )(b) 
of the act provides that 
the [arbitration] agreement shall require that 
(i) one arbitrator be collectively selected by all persons claiming 
damages; 
(ii) one arbitrator be selected by the health care provider; 
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(iii) a third arbitrator be jointly selected by all persons claiming 
damages and the health care provider from a list of individuals 
approved as arbitrators by the state or federal courts of Utah; 
* * * 
A single patient is typically the only physically injured party in a medical malpractice 
action. It is clear, therefore, the legislature anticipated that arbitration agreements would 
encompass claims for damages other than those brought by the injured patient such as 
wrongful death and loss of consortium claims. Other courts have enforced arbitration 
agreements against the spouse and heirs for wrongful death, see, e.g., Allen v. Pacheco, 
71 P.3d 375, 379, 80 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) (enforcement denied on other grounds), as 
well as persons claiming damages for loss of consortium who were not signatories to the 
arbitration agreement,4 see, e.g., Georgia Power Co. v. Partin, 727 So.2d 2 (Ala. 1998) 
(spouse's loss of consortium claim subject to employee's arbitration agreement). 
Moreover, this Court has held that arbitration agreements are favored in Utah. See 
Allred, 909 P.2d at 1265. In Allred, this Court unanimously upheld the enforceability of 
an arbitration clause in a long-term disability policy stating: 
The [Arbitration] Act supports arbitration of both present and future 
disputes and reflects long-standing public policy favoring speedy and 
inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
4Claims for wrongful death and loss of consortium similarly attempt to compensate 
for loss of society, love, comfort, and protection. Compare Norton v. MacFarlane, 818 
P.2d 8 (Utah 1991) (discussing loss of consortium) with In re Behrnfs Estate, 213 P.2d 
657, 661 (Utah 1950) (discussing wrongful death). 
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In the instant case, there is no question that Mr. Baker expressly agreed to arbitrate 
claims relating to the medical care rendered or which should have been rendered which is 
the basis for the Bakers' claims. Specifically, the agreement provides: 
Article 1: Agreement to Arbitrate: We hereby agree to submit to 
binding arbitration all disputes and claims for damages of any kind for 
injuries and losses arising from the medical care rendered or which should 
have been rendered after the date of this Agreement. All claims for 
monetary damages against the physician, and the physician's partners, 
associates, association, corporation or partnership, and the employees, 
agents and estates of any of them (herein collectively referred to as 
"physician"), must be arbitrated including without limitation, claims for 
personal injury, loss of consortium, wrongful death, emotional distress 
or punitive damages 
(R at 10.) (Emphasis added). 
Mr. Baker entered into the agreement to arbitrate on April 3, 2001, prior to any 
treatment by Dr. Rosenthal. Mr. Baker had ample opportunity to consider the agreement 
prior to receiving any care. Indeed, Mr. Baker expressly affirmed that he understood and 
voluntarily entered into the agreement: 
Article 7: Read and Understood: I (Patient or Patient's representative ) 
have read and I understand the above Agreement. I understand that I have 
the right to have my questions about arbitration answered and I do not have 
any unanswered questions. I execute this agreement of my own free will 
and not under any duress, and I understand that [] my signing this 
agreement is not a requirement in order to receive medical services from 
Physician. 
(RatlO.) 
The Arbitration Agreement is valid and binding upon the Bakers and the district 
court erred by refusing to enforce the agreement according to Utah law. 
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3. Public Policy Favors Enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement 
Because It Gives Effect to the Parties5 Intent and Avoids 
Physician-Patient Privacy Concerns. 
Other courts have expressed the concern that if an arbitration agreement cannot be 
enforced against the heirs or spouse of the patient absent the heir's or spouse's signature, 
a patient's privacy is jeopardized because "to authorize an intrusion into a patient's 
confidential relationship with a physician as the price for guaranteeing a third person, 
even a spouse, access to a jury trial on matters arising from the patient's own treatment, 
poses problems of a particularly serious nature." Gross v. Recabaren, 206 Cal.App.3d 
771, 782 (1988) (emphasis in original). 
The significance of a patient's personal privacy rights with respect to a medical 
matters is accorded special protection by Utah's legislature, see, e.g., Rule 506, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (physician-patient privilege); Utah Code Ann. § 58-17a-502(10) 
(prohibiting disclosure of confidential pharmacy records); 58-44a-502(l) (prohibiting 
"disregard for a patient's dignity or right to privacy as to his person, condition, 
possessions, or medical records" by a nurse-midwife), and the rules promulgated under 
the recently effective Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
("HIPAA") (imposes significant fines, penalties, and/or jail time for non-compliance with 
privacy rules). Moreover, Utah courts have recognized that "a patient has a right of 
privacy and self-determination as regards his or her own medical care." Lounsbury v. 
Capel, 836 P.2d 188, 198 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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The Gross court further explained that 
[i]t would appear indisputable that if spouses disagree on any 
decision regarding the terms of medical treatment, including the 
desirability of an arbitration provision, the view of only one can 
prevail. Inasmuch as the patient is more directly and immediately 
affected, as between the two, the balance must weigh in that 
individual's favor. 
Gross, 206 Cal.App.3d at 782. Likewise, this Court should recognize the importance of 
Mr. Baker's- and all patients'-privacy rights and rights of personal determination by 
enforcing the Arbitration Agreement as Mr. Baker intended, in favor of arbitration of all 
"claims for personal injury, loss of consortium, [and] wrongful death . . ." asserted by the 
Bakers. (R. at 10.) (Arbitration Agreement, Article 1.) 
XII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Dr. Rosenthal respectfully requests that the Court 
reverse the district court's order refusing to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration 
and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with the Arbitration 
Agreement. 
DATED this / J>^day of February, 2004. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
JrianP.Vfiller 
Kenneth L. Reich 
Attorneys for Appellant and Defendant 
Richard M. Rosenthal, M.D. 
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50 South Main Street, #1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 359-7000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRISTINE BAKER, For Herself and on 
Behalf of the Heirs of GARY BAKER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREGORY P. STEVENS, M.D., RICHARD 
M. ROSENTHAL, M.D., and IHC HEALTH 
CENTER - HOLLADAY, j 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
COMPEL ARBITRATION 
Civil No. 020404386 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
The defendants' Motions to Compel Arbitration came before the Court for hearing 
pursuant to notice on Wednesday, April 9,2003, at 2:00 p.m., the Honorable Claudia Laycock 
presiding. The plaintiff was represented by Craig M. Snyder. The defendant, Richard M. 
Rosenthal, M.D., was represented by Brian P. Miller. The defendants, Gregory P. Stevens, M.D., 
and IHC Health Center-Holladay, were represented by Larry R. White. The Court having 
reviewed the briefs of the plaintiff and the defendants and having heard oral argument and being 
fully advised in the premises finds that plaintiffs wrongful death action is separate and distinct 
from the cause of action the deceased would have had for personal injuries had he survived. 
Therefore, plaintiffs' cause of action for wrongful death is wholly separate and distinct from any 
action her husband might have maintained. Furthermore, she did not sign the Arbitration 
Agreement. The Court being fully advised in the premises and good cause therefore appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendants' 
Motions to Compel Arbitration should be and the same are hereby denied. 
DATED this J ^ day of May, 2003. 
DISTRICT COURT




District Court Judge 
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HOWARD LEWIS & PETERSEN 
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SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place 11th Floor 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
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ARBITRATION AGREEMENT^ 
Article 1: Agreement to Arbitrate: We hereby agree to submit to binding arbitration all disputes and claims for damages of 
any kind for injuries and losses arising from the medical care rendered or which should have been rendered after the date of this" 
Agreement Ail claims for monetary damages against the physician, and the physician's partners, associates, association, corporation 
or partnership, and the employees, agents and estates of any of them (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Physician"), must be 
arbitrated including, without limitation, claims for personal injury, loss of consortium, wrongful death, emotional distress or punitive 
damages. We agree that the Physician may pursue a legal action to collect any fee from the patient and doing so shall not waive the 
Physician's right to compel arbitration of any malpractice claim. However, following the assertion of any malpractice claim against 
the Physician, any fee dispute, whether or not the subject of any existing legal action, shall also be resolved by arbitration. 
We expressly intend that this Agreement shall bind all persons whose claims for injuries and losses arise out of medical care 
rendered or which should have been rendered by Physician after the date of this Agreement, including any spouse or heirs of the 
patient and any children, whether born or unborn at the time of the occurrence giving rise to any claim (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as "Patient"). 
Article 2: Waiver of Right of Trial; We expressly waive all rights to pursue any legal action to seek damages or any other 
remedies in a court of law, including the right to a jury or court trial, except to enforce our decision to arbitrate, to collect any 
arbitration award and to facilitate the arbitration process as permitted by the Utah Arbitration Act. 
Article 3: Procedures and Appointment of Arbitrators: Patient shall serve Physician by certified mail with a written 
demand for arbitration which shall specify the nature of the claim, die date of the claimed occurrence, the complained of conduct by 
the Physician, and a description of the Patients' injuries and damages. Within 60 days after the demand, die parties shall agree upon a 
neutral arbitrator to be selected from a list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the State or Federal courts of Utah. If the parties 
cannot agree upon a neutral arbitrator, die court shall select an individual from that list. The neutral arbitrator shall: preside over the 
arbitration hearing and pre-arbitration conferences; establish scheduling orders; supervise the conduct of discovery to prevent abuse 
and msm efficiency and cost-effectiveness; rule on all motions, including motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss for 
failure to proceed with reasonable diligence; administer oaths; issue subpoenas; and exercise other powers granted to arbitrators in the 
Utah Arbitration Act. Within six months of the demand for arbitration or as otherwise ordered by the neutral arbitrator, Patient shall 
select one arbitrator and Physician shall select one arbitrator. Patient and Physician shall pay the fees and expenses of his or her own 
arbitrator. Each parry shall share equally the expenses and fees of the neutral arbitrator. The panies agree that the arbitrators have the 
immunity of a judicial officer from civil liability when acting in the capacity of an arbitrator under this Agreement. 
All claims based on the same occurrence, incident, or care shall be arbitrated in one proceeding: however, Patient or 
Physician shall have the absolute right to arbitrate separately issues of liability and damage upon written request to the neutral 
arbitrator. Arbitration hearings will be held in die County of the Physician's principal place of business or elsewhere as the parties 
may agree. 
The parties consent to the participation in this arbitration of any person or entity that would otherwise be a proper additional 
parry in a court action and which agrees to be bound by die arbitration decision. Any existing court action against such additional 
person or entity shall be stayed upon agreement to participate in the arbitration. 
The parties agree that the arbitration proceedings are private, not public, and the privacy of the parties and of the arbitration 
proceedings shall be preserved. 
Article 4: Applicable Law; Widi respect to any matter not herein expressly provided for, the arbitration shall be governed 
by the Utah Arbitration Act. All provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, with die exception of die nonce of intent and 
pre-lidgation hearing requirements which the parties hereby waive, shall apply to the arbitration. The comparative fault provisions of 
Utah law apply to the arbitration and the arbitrators shall apportion fault to all persons or entities who contributed to the claimed injury 
whether or not they are parties to the arbitration. 
Article 5: Revocation: This Agreement may be revoked by written notice mailed to die Physician, by certified mail, within 
30 days after signature, and if not revoked shall govern all medical services received by die Patient after the date of this Agreement 
Article 6: Term: the term of this Agreement is one year from the date it is signed. It shall be automatically renewed from 
year to year thereafter unless either party to this Agreement notifies the other of his or her election not to renew in writing delivered by 
certified mail prior to die renewal date. 
Article 7: Read and Understood: I (Patient or Patient's representative) have read and I understand the above Agreement I 
understand that I have die right to have my questions about arbitration answered and 1 do not have any unanswered questions. I 
execute this agreement of my own free will and not under any duress, and 1 understand that I my signing this agreement is not a 
requirement in order to receive medical services from Physician. 
Article 8: Received Copy I have received a copy of this document. 
Article 9: Severability: If any provision of this Agreement is held invalid or unenforceable, die remaining provisions shall 
remain in full force and shall not be affected by the invalidity of any other provision. 
78-31a-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arbitration C.J.S. — 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 58. 
and Award § 84. 
78-31a-3. Arbitration agreement [Repealed effective May 
15, 2003]. 
A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy' to 
arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing 
at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as 
provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
History: C. 1953, 78-31a-3, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 225, § 1. 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws 
2002, ch. 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and 
enacts a new Chapter 31a in its place, effective 
May 15, 2003. 
Cross-References. — Labor Commission to 
promote voluntary arbitration of labor dis-











Absent a statutory prohibition, a municipal 
corporation has the power to submit to arbitra-
tion any claim asserted by or against it. Lindon 
City v/Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P2d 1070 
(Utah 1981). 
Oral modification. 
Because standard principles of contract con-
struction allow parties to agree to modify a 
written contract by their conduct or oral agree-
ment, an unwritten agreement to modify the 
jurisdiction of an arbitrator was enforceable. 
Pacific Dev., L.C. v. Orton, 1999 UT App 217, 
982 P.2d 94. 
Prerequisites. 
Because this section provides that only a 
written agreement to submit a claim to arbitra-
tion is valid and enforceable, an arbitration 
agreement must be written to be enforceable 
under § 78-3 la-4. Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 
796 (Utah 1998). 
Partnership, single partner may not submit 
to arbitration, § 48-1-6. 
Policy that work terms and conditions should 
result from voluntary agreement, § 34-20-1. 
Public transit district labor disputes, § 17A-
2-1032. 
Water disputes, informal arbitration by state 
engineer, § 73-2-16. 
Unconscionability. 
—Procedural. 
Where patient was given the physician-pa-
tient arbitration agreement to sign just min-
utes before her surgery without any opportu-
nity to discuss the terms of the agreement or 
the option of not signing it, the elements of 
procedural unconscionability surrounded the 
negotiation of this agreement. Sosa v. Paulos, 
924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996). 
—Substantive. 
The term in a physician-patient arbitration 
agreement, requiring the arbitration panel to 
be comprised of neutrally selected orthopedic 
surgeons, is not, when standing alone, "so one-
sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an 
innocent party" and constitute susbstantive un-
conscionability. Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 
(Utah 1996). 
The term in a physician-patient arbitration 
agreement, requiring payment of costs by a 
patient who wins less than half the amount of 
damages sought in arbitration, is substantively 
unconscionable on its face, considering that 
under this term, the patient must pay the 
doctor's attorney's fees and costs, even in situ-
ations where the physician is determined to 
have committed malpractice. Sosa v. Paulos, 
924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996). 
Waiver. 
Waiver of a contractual right of arbitration 
must be based on both a finding of participation 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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MALPRACTICE ACTIONS 78-14-17 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Liability of hospital or sanitarium 
for negligence of physician or surgeon, 51 
A.L.R.4th 235. 
78-14-16. Proceedings considered a binding arbitration 
hearing upon written agreement of parties — 
Compensation to members of panel. 
Upon written agreement by all parties, the proceeding may be considered a 
binding arbitration hearing and proceed under Title 78, Chapter 31a, except 
for the selection of the panel, which is done as set forth in Subsection 
78-14-12(4). If the proceeding is considered an arbitration proceeding, the 
parties are equally responsible for compensation to the members of the panel 
for services rendered. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14-16, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 238, § 5. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Arbitration of medical malpractice 
claims, 24 A.L.R.5th 1. 
78-14-17. Arbitration agreements. 
(1) After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration agreement between a 
patient and a health care provider to be validly executed or, if the requirements 
of this Subsection (1) have not been previously met on at least one occasion, 
renewed: 
(a) the patient shall be given, in writing and by verbal explanation, the 
following information on: 
(i) the requirement that the patient must arbitrate a claim instead 
of having the claim heard by a judge or jury; 
(ii) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in which arbitrators 
are selected under the agreement; 
(iii) the patient's responsibility, if any, for arbitration-related costs 
under the agreement; 
(iv) the right of the patient to decline to enter into the agreement 
and still receive health care; 
(v) the automatic renewal of the agreement each year unless the 
agreement is canceled in writing before the renewal date; and 
(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about the arbitration 
agreement answered; and 
(b) the agreement shall require that: 
(i) one arbitrator be collectively selected by all persons claiming 
damages; 
(ii) one arbitrator be selected by the health care provider; 
(iii) a third arbitrator be jointly selected by all persons claiming 
damages and the health care provider from a list of individuals 
approved as arbitrators by the state or federal courts of Utah; 
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(iv) all parties waive the requirement of Section 78-14-12 to appear 
before a hearing panel in a malpractice action against a health care 
provider; 
(v) the patient be given the right to rescind the agreement within 
30 days of signing the agreement; and 
(vi) the term of the agreement be for one year and that the 
agreement be automatically renewed each year unless the agreement 
is canceled in writing by the patient or health care provider before the 
renewal date. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a patient may not be denied health care 
of any kind on the sole basis that the patient or a person described in 
Subsection (5) refused to enter into a binding arbitration agreement with a 
health care provider. 
(3) A written acknowledgment of having received a written and verbal 
explanation of a binding arbitration agreement signed by or on behalf of the 
patient shall be a defense to a claim that the patient did not receive a written 
and verbal explanation of the agreement as required by Subsection (1) unless 
the patient: 
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement lacked the 
capacity to do so; or 
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the execution of the 
agreement was induced by the health care provider's affirmative acts of 
fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to state material 
facts. 
(4) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a claim governed by 
a binding arbitration agreement that was executed or renewed before May 3, 
1999. 
(5) A legal guardian or a person described in Subsection 78-14-5(4), except a 
person temporarily standing in loco parentis, may execute or rescind a binding 
arbitration agreement on behalf of a patient. 
(6) This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement that is subject 
to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq. 
History: C. 1953, 78-14-17, enacted by L. became effective on May 3, 1999, pursuant to 
1999, ch. 278, § 1. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1999, ch. 278 
CHAPTER 14a 
LIMITATION OF THERAPIST'S 
DUTY TO WARN 
Section 
78-14a-101. Definitions. 
78-14a-102. Limitation of therapist's duty to 
warn. 
78-14a-101. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter, "therapist" means: 
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78-11-11. Submitting controversy without action. 
Parties to a question in difference, which might be the subject of a civil 
action, may without action agree upon a case containing the facts upon which 
the controversy depends, and present a submission of the same to any court 
which would have jurisdiction if an action had been brought. But it must 
appear by affidavit that the controversy is real, and that the proceeding is in 
good faith, to determine the rights of the parties. The court must thereupon 
hear and determine the case and render judgment thereon as if an action were 
pending. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-11-17. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agreed Case C.J.S. — 83 C.J.S. Submission of Contro-
§ 1 et seq. versy § 1 et seq. 
78-11-12. Survival of action for injury to person or death 
upon death of wrongdoer or injured person — 
Exception and restriction to out-of-pocket ex-
penses. 
(1) (a) Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the person or death 
caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another do not abate upon the 
death of the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured person or the 
personal representatives or heirs of the person who died have a cause of 
action against the wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the 
wrongdoer for special and general damages, subject to Subsection (l)(b). 
(b) If prior to judgment or settlement the injured person dies as a result 
of a cause other than the injury received as a result of the wrongful act or 
negligence of the wrongdoer, the personal representatives or heirs of that 
person have a cause of action against the wrongdoer or personal repre-
sentatives of the wrongdoer only for special damages occurring prior to 
death that result from the injury caused by the wrongdoer, including 
income loss. "Special damages" does not include pain and suffering, loss of 
enjoyment of life, and other not readily quantifiable damages frequently 
referred to as general damages. 
(2) Under Subsection (1) neither the injured person nor the personal 
representatives or heirs of the person who died may recover judgment except 
upon competent satisfactory evidence other than the testimony of that injured 
person. 
History: L. 1953, ch. 30, § 1; 1967, ch. 217, tied to sue, effect on statute of limitations, 
§ 1; 1977, ch. 139, § 1; 1991, ch. 113, § 2; §§ 78-12-37, 78-12-38. 
2001, ch. 135, § 1. Statute of limitations, Drug Dealer's Liabil-
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend- ity Act. § 58-37e-13. 
ment, effective April 30, 2001, deleted language
 S t a t u t e o f limitations, wrongful death, § 78-
allowing only out-of-pocket expenses and added 12-28 
the present provisions following "that person"
 W r o f u l d e a t h a c t i o n s > u t a h C o n s t i Art. 
m Subsection (1Kb). ^
 g e c g § § ?g_ w ^ ? 
Cross-References. — Death of person enti-
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(c) the decedent's natural parents, or if the decedent was adopted, 
then his adoptive parents; 
(d) the decedent's stepchildren who: 
(i) are in their minority at the time of decedent's death; and 
(ii) are primarily financially dependent on the decedent. 
(2) "Heirs" means any blood relative as provided by the law of intestate 
succession if the decedent is not survived by a person under Subsections 
(l)(a), (b), or (c). 
History: C. 1953, 78-11-6.5, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 113, § 1; 1998, ch. 39, § 103. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1998, substituted "Sec-
tion 75-2-114" for "Section 75-2-109" in Subsec-
tion (1Kb). 
78-11-7. Death of adult — Suit by heir or personal repre-
sentative. 
Except as provided in Title 35A, Chapter 3, Workers' Compensation Act, 
when the death of a person not a minor is caused by the wrongful act or neglect 
of another, his heirs, or his personal representatives for the benefit of his heirs, 
may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death, or, 
if such person is employed by another person who is responsible for his 
conduct, then also against such other person. If such adult person has a 
guardian at the time of his death, only one action can be maintained for the 
injury to or death of such person, and such action may be brought by either the 
personal representatives of such adult deceased person, for the benefit of his 
heirs, or by such guardian for the benefit of the heirs as provided in Section 
78-11-6. In every action under this and Section 78-11-6 such damages may be 
given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-11-7; L. 1995, ch. 20, § 154; 1996, 
ch. 240, § 373. 
Compiler's Notes. — Title 35A, Chapter 3, 
Workers' Compensation Act, cited in the first 
sentence, was renumbered in 1997 as Title 34A, 
Chapter 2. 
Cross-References. — Comparative negli-
gence, § 78-27-38. 
Payment of medical and similar expenses not 
admission of liability, Rule 409, U.R.E. 
Recovery of damages, Drug Dealer's Liability 
Act, § 58-37e-4 
Right to recover damages for death generally, 
Utah Const., Art. XVI, Sec. 5. 
Statute of limitations, wrongful death, § 78-
12-28. 
Survival of cause of action, §§ 78-11-12. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action by estate. 
Amount of recovery. 
Applicability. 
Assignment of cause of action. 
Assignment of recovery. 
Comparative negligence. 
Conflict of laws. 
Construction. 
Contributory negligence. 
Defense of interspousal tort immunity. 
Determination of heirship. 
Funeral expenses. 
Jury selection. 
Measure of recovery. 
Nonresident aliens. 
Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Property damage. 
Statute of limitations. 
Suit by representative. 
Workers' compensation. 
Action by estate. 
This section makes it clear that the dece-
dent's heirs or his or her personal representa-
tive (on behalf of the heirs) are the only parties 
who may maintain an action for wrongful 
death. The section does not allow the decedent's 
estate to bring and maintain a wrongful death 
action. Estate of Haro v. Haro, 887 P.2d 878 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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30-2-6. Actions based on property rights. 
Should the husband or wife obtain possession or control of property belong-
ing to the other before or after marriage, the owner of the property may 
maintain an action therefor, or for any right growing out of the same, in the 
same manner and to the same extent as if they were unmarried. 
History: R.S. 1898 & CX. 1907, § 1203; 
C.L. 1917, § 2988; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 40-
2-6. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband and 
Wife § 518 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 111. 
30-2-7. Husband's liability for wife's torts. 
For civil injuries committed by a married woman damages may be recovered 
from her alone, and her husband shall not be liable therefor, except in cases 
where he would be jointly liable with her if the marriage did not exist. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1204; 
CX. 1917, § 2989; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 40-
2-7. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband and 
Wife § 427 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 109. 
30-2-8. Agency between husband and wife. 
A husband or wife may constitute the other his or her attorney in fact to 
control and dispose of his or her property for their mutual benefit or otherwise, 
and may revoke the appointment the same as other persons. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1205; 
C.L. 1917, § 2990; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 40-
2-8. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband and A.L.R. — Spouse's acceptance or retention of 
Wife § 230 et seq. benefits of other spouse's fraudulent act as 
C.J.S. — 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife §§ 56 ratification of transaction, 82 A.L.R.3d 625. 
to 59. 
30-2-9. Family expenses — Joint and several liability. 
The expenses of the family and the education of the children are chargeable 
upon the property of both husband and wife or of either of them, and in relation 
thereto they may be sued jointly or separately. 
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XIV. ADDENDUM 
Order of Denying Motion to Compel Arbitration 
Arbitration Agreement 
Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-3 
Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 
Utah Code. Ann. § 78-11-12 and § 78-11-7 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-8 and -9 
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